Designing Nonpoint Source Pollution Policies With Limited Information About Both Risk Attitudes And Production Technology
AbstractA pollution reduction program is designed where information about both technology and risk preferences is asymmetric. Program costs and the distribution of payments depend on the amount of information known to the policy maker. Empirically testable conditions for self-selection are derived; the method is applied to reducing nitrate contamination.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL with number 20720.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
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Environmental Economics and Policy;
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Staff General Research Papers
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Staff General Research Papers
843, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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