Design of optimum private insurance schemes as a means to reduce water overexploitation during drought events. A case study in Campo de Cartagena (Segura River Basin, Spain)
AbstractWater is a key input in the production of many goods and services and under certain conditions can become a critical limiting factor with significant impacts on regional development. This is the case of many agricultural European Mediterranean basins, where water deficit during drought events is partially covered by illegal abstractions, mostly from aquifers, which are tolerated by the authorities. Groundwater overexploitation for irrigation has created in these areas an unprecedented environmental catastrophe that threatens ecosystems sustainability, urban water supply and the current model of development. Commercial drought insurance systems have the potential to introduce the necessary incentives to reduce overexploitation during drought events and the high costs of the drought indemnity paid by the government. This paper develops a methodology to obtain this socially desirable basic risk premium based on concatenated stochastic models. The methodology is applied to the agricultural district of Campo de Cartagena (Segura River Basin, Spain). Results show that the basic premiums in a hypothetic commercial drought insurance market would be reasonable and the expected environmental outcomes significant.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Agricultural Economics Society in its series 86th Annual Conference, April 16-18, 2012, Warwick University, Coventry, UK with number 135090.
Date of creation: Apr 2012
Date of revision:
Drought insurance; stochastic models; groundwater; agriculture; Drought Management Plan; Crop Production/Industries; Risk and Uncertainty; Q15; Q18; Q25; Q51; Q58;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
- Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- Q51 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Valuation of Environmental Effects
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2012-10-13 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2012-10-13 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2012-10-13 (Insurance Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alcott, Blake, 2005. "Jevons' paradox," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 9-21, July.
- Barnett, Barry J. & Black, J. Roy & Hu, Yingyao & Skees, Jerry R., 2005. "Is Area Yield Insurance Competitive with Farm Yield Insurance?," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 30(02), August.
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