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Why Nicaraguan Peasants Remain in Agricultural Production Cooperatives

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  • Lerman, Zvi
  • Ruben, Ruerd
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    Abstract

    Many Nicaraguan peasants remain members in agricultural production cooperatives despite the change in the policy environment that now supports parcellation of cooperative lands into individual holdings. Institutional factors, such as uncertainty of land ownership rights and difficulties with resolution of cooperative debt, are found to play a dominant role in keeping Nicaraguan peasants in cooperatives.

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    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19243
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI with number 19243.

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    Date of creation: 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea05:19243

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    Keywords: Agribusiness;

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    1. Putterman, Louis, 1981. "On optimality in collective institutional choice," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 392-403, December.
    2. Lerman, Zvi & Csaki, Csaba & Feder, Gershon, 2002. "Land policies and evolving farm structures in transition countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2794, The World Bank.
    3. Carter, Michael R, 1987. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Decollectivization of Agriculture," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(3), pages 577-95, September.
    4. Wilson, Paul N & Thompson, Gary D, 1993. "Common Property and Uncertainty: Compensating Coalitions by Mexico's Patoral Ejidatarios," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 299-318, January.
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