The Effects of Information and Interactions on Contagion Processes
AbstractThe network literature commonly neglects the importance of a clear distinction between interactions and information exchanges. Although convenient, this oversight is not innocuous and may lead to erroneous conclusions when looking at mechanisms such as contagion processes. We use simulation methods and conduct a systematic analysis of the implications of such omission. We show that the lack of distinction between information and interaction structures is not without consequences. More precisely, when agents use a myopic best response, only information exchanges matter and interactions can be ignored. With imitation however, both information and interactions play important yet different roles in contagion.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Adelaide, School of Economics in its series School of Economics Working Papers with number 2010-12.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision:
contagion; networks; coordination games; scale-free; small-worlds; best response; imitation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-07-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2010-07-10 (Game Theory)
- NEP-ICT-2010-07-10 (Information & Communication Technologies)
- NEP-SOC-2010-07-10 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dunia López-Pintado, 2006. "Contagion and coordination in random networks," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 371-381, October.
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2008. "Contagion and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 251-274, November.
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