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The History of Corporate Ownership in Italy

In: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers

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  • Alexander Aganin
  • Paolo Volpin

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  • Alexander Aganin & Paolo Volpin, 2005. "The History of Corporate Ownership in Italy," NBER Chapters, in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 325-366, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:10273
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    File URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10273.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Family Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2167-2201, October.
    2. Matias Braun & Claudio Raddatz, 2004. "Trade liberalization and the politics of financial development," Working Papers 04-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    3. Shleifer, Andrei & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2002. "Investor protection and equity markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 3-27, October.
    4. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
    5. Bernard Yeung & Randall Morck & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2004. "Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth," Working Papers 04-21, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    6. Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Family Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2167-2202, October.
    7. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2003. "The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 5-50, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2009. "Never Waste a Good Crisis: An Historical Perspective on Comparative Corporate Governance," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 145-179, November.
    2. Piccardi, Carlo & Calatroni, Lisa & Bertoni, Fabio, 2010. "Communities in Italian corporate networks," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 389(22), pages 5247-5258.
    3. Heitor Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2005. "A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups," NBER Working Papers 11368, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Almeida, Heitor & Park, Sang Yong & Subrahmanyam, Marti G. & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2011. "The structure and formation of business groups: Evidence from Korean chaebols," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 447-475, February.
    5. Leonardo Bargigli & Renato Giannetti, 2015. "The Italian Corporate System: SOEs, Private Firms and Institutions in a Network Perspective (1952-1983)," Working Papers - Economics wp2015_01.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    6. Croci, Ettore & Petmezas, Dimitris, 2010. "Minority shareholders' wealth effects and stock market development: Evidence from increase-in-ownership M&As," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 681-694, March.
    7. Agrawal, Ashwini K., 2013. "The impact of investor protection law on corporate policy and performance: Evidence from the blue sky laws," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 417-435.
    8. Randall Morck, 2009. "The Riddle of the Great Pyramids," NBER Working Papers 14858, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Ouyang, Wenjing & Zhu, Pengcheng, 2016. "An international study of shareholder protection in freeze-out M&A transactions," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 157-171.
    10. Giulia Rotundo & Anna D’Arcangelis, 2010. "Ownership and control in shareholding networks," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 5(2), pages 191-219, December.
    11. Cattaneo, Mattia & Meoli, Michele & Vismara, Silvio, 2015. "Financial regulation and IPOs: Evidence from the history of the Italian stock market," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 116-131.
    12. Bargigli, L. & Giannetti, R., 2018. "The Italian corporate system in a network perspective (1952–1983)," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 494(C), pages 367-379.
    13. Bena, Jan & Ortiz-Molina, Hernán, 2013. "Pyramidal ownership and the creation of new firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 798-821.
    14. Fogel, Kathy & Morck, Randall & Yeung, Bernard, 2008. "Big business stability and economic growth: Is what's good for General Motors good for America?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 83-108, July.
    15. Caselli, Stefano & Gatti, Stefano & Chiarella, Carlo & Gigante, Gimede & Negri, Giulia, 2023. "Do shareholders really matter for firm performance? Evidence from the ownership characteristics of Italian listed companies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    16. Claessens, Stijn & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2013. "Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 1-33.

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