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Hendrik Rommeswinkel

Personal Details

First Name:Hendrik
Middle Name:
Last Name:Rommeswinkel
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RePEc Short-ID:pro752
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://trembling-hand.com/

Affiliation

Department of Economics
National Taiwan University

Taipei, Taiwan
https://www.econ.ntu.edu.tw/
RePEc:edi:dentutw (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Rommeswinkel, Hendrik, 2019. "Procedural Mixture Spaces," MPRA Paper 92535, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Qin, Wei-zhi & Rommeswinkel, Hendrik, 2017. "Conditionally Additive Utility Representations," MPRA Paper 78158, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Rommeswinkel, Hendrik, 2011. "Measuring Freedom in Games," MPRA Paper 106426, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 03 Mar 2021.
  4. Martin Kolmar & Hendrik Rommeswinkel, 2011. "Technological Determinants of the Group-Size Paradox," CESifo Working Paper Series 3362, CESifo.
  5. Martin Kolmar & Hendrik Rommeswinkel, 2010. "Group Contests with Complementarities in Efforts," CESifo Working Paper Series 3136, CESifo.

Articles

  1. Qin, Wei-Zhi & Rommeswinkel, Hendrik, 2022. "Additive representations on a simplex," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
  2. Martin Kolmar & Hendrik Rommeswinkel, 2020. "Group size and group success in conflicts," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(4), pages 777-822, December.
  3. Kolmar, Martin & Rommeswinkel, Hendrik, 2013. "Contests with group-specific public goods and complementarities in efforts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 9-22.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Martin Kolmar & Hendrik Rommeswinkel, 2011. "Technological Determinants of the Group-Size Paradox," CESifo Working Paper Series 3362, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Hideo Konishi & Chen-Yu Pan, 2019. "Endogenous Alliances in Survival Contests," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 974, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 06 Mar 2021.
    2. Cubel, Maria & Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2012. "The effect of within-group inequality in a conflict against a unitary threat," NEPS Working Papers 4/2012, Network of European Peace Scientists.
    3. Kolmar, Martin, 2013. "Group Conflicts. Where do we stand?," Economics Working Paper Series 1331, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    4. Ricardo Nieva, 2019. "Corruption and paradoxes in alliances," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 41-71, March.
    5. María Cubel & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2014. "Difference-form group contests," Working Papers 2014/6, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).

  2. Martin Kolmar & Hendrik Rommeswinkel, 2010. "Group Contests with Complementarities in Efforts," CESifo Working Paper Series 3136, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. May Elsayyad & Kai A. Konrad, 2011. "Fighting Multiple Tax Havens," Working Papers fighting_multiple_tax_hav, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    2. Michael Funke & Yu-Fu Chen & Aaron Mehrota, 2011. "Global warming and extreme events: Rethinking the timing and intensity of environment policy," Quantitative Macroeconomics Working Papers 21105, Hamburg University, Department of Economics.
    3. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Lee, Dongryul & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2013. "Top guns may not fire: Best-shot group contests with group-specific public good prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 94-103.
    4. Denter, Philipp & Morgan, John & Sisak, Dana, 2011. ""Where Ignorance is Bliss, 'tis Folly to be Wise": Transparency in Contests," Economics Working Paper Series 1128, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.

Articles

  1. Martin Kolmar & Hendrik Rommeswinkel, 2020. "Group size and group success in conflicts," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(4), pages 777-822, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Hideo Konishi & Chen-Yu Pan, 2019. "Endogenous Alliances in Survival Contests," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 974, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 06 Mar 2021.
    2. Stefano Barbieri & Iryna Topolyan, 2021. "Private‐information group contests with complementarities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 772-800, October.

  2. Kolmar, Martin & Rommeswinkel, Hendrik, 2013. "Contests with group-specific public goods and complementarities in efforts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 9-22.

    Cited by:

    1. Martin Kolmar & Hendrik Rommeswinkel, 2020. "Group size and group success in conflicts," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(4), pages 777-822, December.
    2. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Attack-and-Defence Group Contests," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 049, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    3. Indraneel Dasgupta & Ranajoy Guha Neogi, 2018. "Between-group contests over group-specific public goods with within-group fragmentation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(3), pages 315-334, March.
    4. Paul Pecorino, 2015. "Olson’s Logic of Collective Action at fifty," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 243-262, March.
    5. Brookins, Philip & Lightle, John P. & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2015. "Optimal sorting in group contests with complementarities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 311-323.
    6. Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo.
    7. Doruk Cetemen & Can Urgun & Leeat Yariv, 2023. "Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(9), pages 2402-2450.
    8. Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg & Iryna Topolyan, 2014. "The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 603-640, November.
    9. Jay Pil Choi & Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Jaesoo Kim, 2014. "Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry," CESifo Working Paper Series 5137, CESifo.
    10. Hideo Konishi & Chen-Yu Pan, 2019. "Endogenous Alliances in Survival Contests," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 974, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 06 Mar 2021.
    11. Dripto Bakshi & Indraneel Dasgupta, 2021. "A Subscription vs. Appropriation Framework for Natural Resource Conflicts," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Anil Markandya & Dirk Rübbelke (ed.), CLIMATE AND DEVELOPMENT, chapter 9, pages 257-307, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    12. Barbieri, Stefano & Malueg, David A., 2016. "Private-information group contests: Best-shot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 219-234.
    13. Kenzo Imamura & Hideo Konishi & Chen-Yu Pan, 2021. "Stability in Matching with Externalities: Pairs Competition and Oligopolistic Joint Ventures," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1039, Boston College Department of Economics.
    14. Bakshi, Dripto & Dasgupta, Indraneel, 2021. "Internal versus External Rent-Seeking with In-Group Inequality and Public Good Provision," IZA Discussion Papers 14871, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    15. Bose, Gautam & Konrad, Kai A., 2020. "Devil take the hindmost: Deflecting attacks to other defenders," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    16. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2017. "Contests between groups of unknown size," Working Papers wp2017_03_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    17. Guillaume Cheikbossian & Romain Fayat, 2018. "Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts," Post-Print hal-02156268, HAL.
    18. Stefano Barbieri, 2023. "Complementarity and information in collective action," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(1), pages 167-206, January.
    19. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2015. "The Group All-Pay Auction with Heterogeneous Impact Functions," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 069, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    20. Sheremeta, Roman, 2015. "Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research," MPRA Paper 67515, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Pau Balart & Sabine Flamand & Oliver Gürtler & Orestis Troumpounis, 2018. "Sequential choice of sharing rules in collective contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 703-724, October.
    22. Guillaume Cheikbossian, 2021. "Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods," Post-Print hal-03181458, HAL.
    23. Chowdhury, Subhasish & Mukherjee, Anwesha & Sheremeta, Roman, 2021. "In-group versus Out-group Preferences in Intergroup Conflict: An Experiment," MPRA Paper 105690, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    24. Katsuya Kobayashi & Hideo Konishi, 2021. "Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 205-221, February.
    25. Guillaume Cheikbossian, 2019. "Evolutionarily stable in-group altruismin intergroup conflict," CEE-M Working Papers halshs-02291876, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.
    26. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Iryna Topolyan, 2016. "The Max‐Min Group Contest: Weakest‐link (Group) All‐Pay Auction," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(1), pages 105-125, July.
    27. Alex Dickson, 2017. "Multiple-aggregate games," Working Papers 1701, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
    28. Dripto Bakshi & Indraneel Dasgupta, 2021. "Internal vs. external rent-seeking with in-group inequality and public good provision," Discussion Papers 2021-06, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    29. Gregor, Martin, 2015. "Task divisions in teams with complementary tasks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 102-120.
    30. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Max-Min Group Contest," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 050, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    31. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2018. "Group contest success function: The heterogeneous individuals case," Working Papers 2072/332583, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    32. Eliaz, Kfir & Wu, Qinggong, 2018. "A simple model of competition between teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 372-392.
    33. Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "The social cost of contestable benefits," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-11, CIRANO.
    34. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2018. "The Optimal Defense Of Networks Of Targets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 2195-2211, October.
    35. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Entry in group contests," Working Papers wp2020_02_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    36. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2021. "Contests with multiple alternative prizes: Public-good/bad prizes and externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 103-116.
    37. Kolmar, Martin, 2013. "Group Conflicts. Where do we stand?," Economics Working Paper Series 1331, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    38. Denter, Philipp & Morgan, John & Sisak, Dana, 2011. ""Where Ignorance is Bliss, 'tis Folly to be Wise": Transparency in Contests," Economics Working Paper Series 1128, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    39. Dongryul Lee & Pilwon Kim, 2022. "Group formation in a dominance-seeking contest," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(1), pages 39-68, January.
    40. Dongryul Lee & Joon Song, 2019. "Optimal Team Contests to Induce More Efforts," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 20(3), pages 448-476, April.
    41. Cardona, Daniel & Rubí-Barceló, Antoni, 2016. "Group-contests with endogenous claims," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 97-111.
    42. Shmuel Nitzan & Kaoru Ueda, 2014. "Cost Sharing in Collective Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 4825, CESifo.
    43. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2016. "Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 959-971, December.
    44. Avidit Acharya & Takuo Sugaya & Eray Turkel, 2022. "Electoral Campaigns as Dynamic Contests," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0293, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    45. Hideo Konishi & Chen-Yu Pan & Dimitar Simeonov, 2023. "Formation of Teams in Contests: Tradeoffs Between Inter and Intra-Team Inequalities," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1061, Boston College Department of Economics.
    46. Mercier, Jean-François, 2018. "Non-deterministic group contest with private information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 47-53.
    47. Bakshi, Dripto & Dasgupta, Indraneel, 2016. "Identity Conflict with Cross-Border Spillovers," IZA Discussion Papers 9731, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    48. Brookins, Philip & Jindapon, Paan, 2021. "Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    49. Barbieri, Stefano, 2017. "Voluntary public good provision with private information using order statistics," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 63-66.
    50. Vázquez-Sedano Alexis, 2018. "Sharing the Effort Costs in Group Contests," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-21, January.
    51. Czyżewski, Bazyli, 2016. "Political Rents of European Farmers in the Sustainable Development Paradigm. International, national and regional perspective," MPRA Paper 74253, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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Statistics

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (2) 2017-04-09 2019-03-11

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