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Carlo Prato

Personal Details

First Name:Carlo
Middle Name:
Last Name:Prato
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:ppr228
http://carloprato.com

Affiliation

Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy (ISERP)
Columbia University

New York City, New York (United States)
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/iserp/
RePEc:edi:iscolus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation and Electoral Incentives," MPRA Paper 82753, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2014. "Electoral Imbalances and their Consequences," MPRA Paper 68650, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Nov 2015.
  3. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2014. "The Voters' Curses: The Upsides and Downsides of Political Engagement," MPRA Paper 53482, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2013. "Rational Ignorance, Elections, and Reform," MPRA Paper 68638, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Dec 2015.
  5. Carlo Prato & Bruno Strulovici, 2010. "Direct Democracy, Political Delegation, and Responsibility Substitution," Discussion Papers 1515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

Articles

  1. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Citizens United: A Theoretical Evaluation," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(3), pages 567-574, July.
  2. Carlo Prato & Bruno Strulovici, 2017. "The hidden cost of direct democracy: How ballot initiatives affect politicians’ selection and incentives," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(3), pages 440-466, July.
  3. Buisseret, Peter & Prato, Carlo, 2016. "Electoral control and the human capital of politicians," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 34-55.
  4. Daniel Diermeier & Carlo Prato & Razvan Vlaicu, 2016. "A bargaining model of endogenous procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 985-1012, December.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation and Electoral Incentives," MPRA Paper 82753, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & Ravindran, Dilip & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 665, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    2. Tomoya Tajika, 2021. "Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(1), pages 67-100, January.

  2. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2014. "Electoral Imbalances and their Consequences," MPRA Paper 68650, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Nov 2015.

    Cited by:

    1. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Rational ignorance, populism, and reform," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86371, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Stephane Wolton, 2019. "Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(3), pages 548-562, July.
    3. Denter, Philipp, 2019. "Campaign Contests," MPRA Paper 97395, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Avidit Acharya & Edoardo Grillo & Takuo Sugaya & Eray Turkel, 2019. "Dynamic Campaign Spending," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 601, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    5. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2013. "Rational Ignorance, Elections, and Reform," MPRA Paper 68638, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Dec 2015.

  3. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2013. "Rational Ignorance, Elections, and Reform," MPRA Paper 68638, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Dec 2015.

    Cited by:

    1. Morelli, Massimo & Nicolò, Antonio & Roberti, Paolo, 2022. "A Commitment Theory of Populism," CEPR Discussion Papers 16051, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Giray Gozgor, 2020. "The Role of Economic Uncertainty in Rising Populism in the EU," CESifo Working Paper Series 8499, CESifo.
    3. Brad R. Taylor, 2020. "The psychological foundations of rational ignorance: biased heuristics and decision costs," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 70-88, March.
    4. Guido Merzoni & Federico Trombetta, 2021. "A Note on Asymmetric Policies: Pandering and State-specific Costs of Mismatch in Political Agency," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis2102, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).
    5. Blumenthal, Benjamin, 2021. "Political Agency and Legislative Subsidies with Imperfect Monitoring," SocArXiv ydfbs, Center for Open Science.
    6. Luciano Campos & Agustín Casas, 2020. "Rara Avis: Latin American populism in the 21st century," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4322, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    7. François Facchini & Louis Jaeck, 2021. "Populism and the rational choice model: The case of the French National Front," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(2), pages 196-228, May.
    8. Fabrizio Botti & Marcella Corsi, 2019. "La destra populista in Europa: una prospettiva economica (The populist right in Europe: An economic perspective)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 72(286), pages 133-147.
    9. Leyla D. Karakas & Devashish Mitra, 2021. "Electoral competition in the presence of identity politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(2), pages 169-197, April.
    10. Tinghua Yu & Elliott Ash, 2021. "Polarization and Political Selection," BCAM Working Papers 2105, Birkbeck Centre for Applied Macroeconomics.
    11. Marina Agranov & Ran Eilat & Konstantin Sonin, 2020. "A Political Model of Trust," Working Papers 2020-50, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    12. Morelli, Massimo & Sasso, Greg, 2020. "Bureaucrats under Populism," CEPR Discussion Papers 14499, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Giray Gozgor, 2022. "The role of economic uncertainty in the rise of EU populism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 229-246, January.
    14. Emilio Ocampo, 2019. "The Economic Analysis of Populism. A Selective Review of the Literature," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 694, Universidad del CEMA.

  4. Carlo Prato & Bruno Strulovici, 2010. "Direct Democracy, Political Delegation, and Responsibility Substitution," Discussion Papers 1515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Le Bihan, Patrick, 2015. "Popular Referendum and Electoral Accountability," IAST Working Papers 15-31, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    2. Tim Willems, 2013. "Political Accountability and Policy Experimentation: Why to Elect Left-Handed Politicians?," Economics Series Working Papers 647, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Citizens United: A Theoretical Evaluation," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(3), pages 567-574, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Alexander, Dan, 2021. "Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 163-185.
    2. Keith E. Schnakenberg & Ian R. Turner, 2021. "Helping Friends or Influencing Foes: Electoral and Policy Effects of Campaign Finance Contributions," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 88-100, January.

  2. Carlo Prato & Bruno Strulovici, 2017. "The hidden cost of direct democracy: How ballot initiatives affect politicians’ selection and incentives," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(3), pages 440-466, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Haritz Garro, 2019. "Terrorism prevention with reelection concerns and valence competition," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 330-369, July.
    2. Peter Buisseret & Richard Van Weelden, 2022. "Pandora's Ballot Box: Electoral Politics of Direct Democracy," Papers 2208.05535, arXiv.org.
    3. Torun Dewan & John W Patty, 2018. "Editors’ Introduction to JTP issue 30.4," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(4), pages 385-387, October.
    4. Tomoya Tajika, 2018. "Signature requirements for initiatives," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(4), pages 451-476, October.

  3. Buisseret, Peter & Prato, Carlo, 2016. "Electoral control and the human capital of politicians," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 34-55.

    Cited by:

    1. Julio Alberto Ramos-Pastrana, 2017. "Who's Getting the Office? Autocracy And Elected Politicians' Career Path: Evidence from the Mexican States," CAEPR Working Papers 2017-008, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    2. Fehrler, Sebastian & Fischbacher, Urs & Schneider, Maik, 2017. "Who Runs? Honesty and Self-Selection into Politics," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168083, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Pique, Ricardo, 2019. "Higher pay, worse outcomes? The impact of mayoral wages on local government quality in Peru," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 1-20.
    4. Prasenjit Banerjee & Vegard Iversen & Sandip Mitra & Antonio Nicolò & Kunal Sen, 2019. "Politicians and their promises in an uncertain world: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in India," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2019-60, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    5. Mizuno, Nobuhiro & Okazawa, Ryosuke, 2018. "Why do voters elect less qualified candidates?," MPRA Paper 89215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Lindsey Gailmard, 2022. "Electoral accountability and political competence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(2), pages 236-261, April.

  4. Daniel Diermeier & Carlo Prato & Razvan Vlaicu, 2016. "A bargaining model of endogenous procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 985-1012, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Marina Azzimonti & Laura Karpuska & Gabriel Mihalache, 2023. "Bargaining Over Taxes And Entitlements In The Era Of Unequal Growth," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(3), pages 893-941, August.
    2. Jeon, Jee Seon & Hwang, Ilwoo, 2022. "The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: A dynamic model of endogenous political power," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    3. Zapal, Jan, 2020. "Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    4. Marina Azzimonti & Gabriel P. Mihalache & Laura Karpuska, 2020. "Bargaining over Taxes and Entitlements," NBER Working Papers 27595, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Thomas Choate & John A Weymark & Alan E. Wiseman, 2018. "Legislative Bargaining and Partisan Delegation," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 18-00010, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    6. Hülya Eraslan & Kirill S. Evdokimov & Jan Zápal, 2022. "Dynamic Legislative Bargaining," Springer Books, in: Emin Karagözoğlu & Kyle B. Hyndman (ed.), Bargaining, chapter 0, pages 151-175, Springer.
    7. Kim, Duk Gyoo, 2019. "Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 161-175.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (5) 2011-01-30 2014-02-15 2016-01-18 2016-01-18 2018-02-05. Author is listed
  2. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (5) 2011-01-30 2014-02-15 2016-01-18 2016-01-18 2018-02-05. Author is listed
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2011-01-30 2018-02-05
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2014-02-15
  5. NEP-SOG: Sociology of Economics (1) 2014-02-15

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