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Rene Kirkegaard

Personal Details

First Name:Rene
Middle Name:
Last Name:Kirkegaard
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pki48
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://www.renekirkegaard.com/

Affiliation

Department of Economics and Finance
Gordon Lang School of Business and Economics
University of Guelph

Guelph, Canada
http://www.uoguelph.ca/economics/
RePEc:edi:degueca (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. René Kirkegaard, 2020. "Microfounded Contest Design," Working Papers 2003, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  2. Timothy P. Hubbard & Rene Kirkegaard, 2015. "Asymmetric Auctions with More Than Two Bidders," Working Papers 1502, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  3. Rene Kirkegaard, 2015. "Contracting with Private Rewards," Working Papers 1504, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  4. Rene Kirkegaard, 2011. "Ranking Asymmetric Auctions using the Dispersive Order," Working Papers 1101, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  5. Timothy P. Hubbard & Rene Kirkegaard & Harry J. Paarsch, 2011. "Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 207, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  6. Rene Kirkegaard, 2010. "Incomplete Information and Rent Dissipation in Deterministic Contests," Working Papers 1012, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  7. Rene Kirkegaard, 2010. "Preferential Treatment may Hurt: Another Application of the All-Pay Auction," Working Papers 1005, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  8. Rene Kirkegaard, 2008. "Favoritism in Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps," Working Papers 0805, Brock University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008.
  9. René Kirkegaard, 2007. "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," Working Papers 0702, Brock University, Department of Economics.
  10. Kirkegaard, René & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 2005. "Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions," Economics Working Papers 2005-17, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
  11. Rene Kirkegaard, 2005. "A Simple Approach to Analyzing Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Working Papers 0504, Brock University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2005.
  12. Kirkegaard, René & Overgaard, Per Baltzer, "undated". "Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand," Economics Working Papers 2003-4, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.

Articles

  1. René Kirkegaard, 2023. "Contest Design with Stochastic Performance," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 201-238, February.
  2. Kirkegaard, René, 2023. "Endogenous criteria for success," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
  3. Kirkegaard, René, 2022. "Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 234-239.
  4. Kirkegaard, René, 2021. "Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
  5. René Kirkegaard, 2020. "Contracting with private rewards," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 589-612, June.
  6. Elskamp, Rebecca & Kirkegaard, René, 2019. "Scale effects in multi-unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 116-121.
  7. Kirkegaard, René, 2017. "Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 373-387.
  8. Kirkegaard, René, 2017. "A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
  9. Kirkegaard, René, 2014. "Ranking asymmetric auctions: Filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 60-69.
  10. Kirkegaard, René, 2013. "Incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 261-266.
  11. Kirkegaard, René, 2013. "Handicaps in incomplete information all-pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 98-110.
  12. Timothy Hubbard & René Kirkegaard & Harry Paarsch, 2013. "Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 42(2), pages 241-266, August.
  13. René Kirkegaard, 2012. "A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(5), pages 2349-2364, September.
  14. Kirkegaard, René, 2012. "Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 226-248.
  15. Kirkegaard, René, 2009. "Asymmetric first price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1617-1635, July.
  16. Kirkegaard, René & Overgaard, Per Baltzer, 2008. "Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 145-165, May.
  17. Kirkegaard Rene, 2008. "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-32, September.
  18. René Kirkegaard & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 2008. "Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 770-789, September.
  19. René Kirkegaard, 2006. "A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 449-452, June.
  20. Kirkegaard, Rene, 2005. "Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(3), pages 328-332, December.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 11 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (6) 2010-05-02 2010-09-11 2011-03-12 2011-05-24 2015-06-20 2020-03-16. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (4) 2005-10-22 2015-04-19 2015-06-20 2020-03-16
  3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2003-04-09 2005-10-22
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2005-10-22 2005-12-01
  5. NEP-CMP: Computational Economics (1) 2011-05-24
  6. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2015-06-20
  7. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2020-03-16

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