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¿Quiénes deciden la política social? Economía política de programas sociales en América Latina

Author

Listed:
  • Bonvecchi, Alejandro
  • Henríquez, José
  • Johannsen, Julia
  • Morales, Natasha
  • Scartascini, Carlos

Abstract

¿Por qué algunos programas sociales tienen éxito y otros no? Porque las políticas públicas no se diseñan y ejecutan en el vacío: son parte fundamental del juego político. Con este libro se intenta ayudar a entender cómo funciona el proceso decisorio en la realidad analizándolo con un nuevo lente metodológico en el que se combinan el análisis de redes sociales y el de economía política. Se emplean estos instrumentos para mostrar cómo pueden ser aplicados para examinar casos concretos de programas sociales en la región. Se espera que los hallazgos de esta investigación contribuyan a entender los resultados de las políticas públicas, así como a un mejor diseño operativo y a una ejecución más eficiente de los programas sociales en América Latina.

Suggested Citation

  • Bonvecchi, Alejandro & Henríquez, José & Johannsen, Julia & Morales, Natasha & Scartascini, Carlos, 2015. "¿Quiénes deciden la política social? Economía política de programas sociales en América Latina," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 7065, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:idbbks:7065
    DOI: https://doi.org/10.18235/0000076
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    IDB-BK-146; Political institutions; political economy; social policy; public administration; budget allocation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

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