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Application of Game Theory in Describing Efficacy of Decision Making in Sportsman's Tactical Performance in Team Sports

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  • Joško Sindik

    ()
    (Kindergarten Trnoružica)

  • Nives Vidak

    (University of Dubrovnik)

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    Abstract

    A mathematical method of decision-making in which a competitive or cooperative situation is analyzed to determine the optimal course of action for an interested "player" is often called game theory. Game theory has very broad application in different sciences. Team sports tactical performance is considered from the aspects of data processing theory and the phenomenon of selective attention, as well as from the game theory. Team sports tactical performance is an asymmetric, sequential (of imperfect information), non-zero-sum game. In decision making, predictability in team sports is in fact bargaining, and the player has to use a mixed strategy for choosing option with highest expected utility. Player could choose a trembling hand equilibrium, to eliminate imperfect equilibrium. Strategic dominance conceipt can explain that a player could choose strategy which dominates between other possible strategies, and/or could be led by "team reasoning", too. In this article, the level of predictability of the most frequent tactical performance of one player in a team sport game is considered, reflecting outcomes both for the same team’s tactical performance (co-players in one player’s team), as well as for the opponent team’s tactical performance. Four different possible situations during team sport competition could lead to considering utilities of one player’s specific decisions.

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    File URL: http://indecs.eu/2008/indecs2008-pp53-66.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Croatian Interdisciplinary Society Provider Homepage: http://indecs.eu in its journal Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems.

    Volume (Year): 6 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 53-66

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    Handle: RePEc:zna:indecs:v:6:y:2008:i:1:p:53-66

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    Related research

    Keywords: game theory; team sport; tactics;

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    1. Sugden, Robert, 1995. "A Theory of Focal Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 533-50, May.
    2. Bacharach, Michael, 1999. "Interactive team reasoning: A contribution to the theory of co-operation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 117-147, June.
    3. Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Assessment: The Economics of Sport," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(4), pages 467-477, Winter.
    4. Colman, Andrew M. & Stirk, Jonathan A., 1998. "Stackelberg reasoning in mixed-motive games: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 279-293, April.
    5. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    6. SZYMANSKI, Stefan & KÉSENNE, Stefan, 2003. "Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports," Working Papers 2003003, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
    7. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    8. Andrew Colman, 1997. "Salience and focusing in pure coordination games," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 61-81.
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