Application of Game Theory in Describing Efficacy of Decision Making in Sportsman's Tactical Performance in Team Sports
AbstractA mathematical method of decision-making in which a competitive or cooperative situation is analyzed to determine the optimal course of action for an interested "player" is often called game theory. Game theory has very broad application in different sciences. Team sports tactical performance is considered from the aspects of data processing theory and the phenomenon of selective attention, as well as from the game theory. Team sports tactical performance is an asymmetric, sequential (of imperfect information), non-zero-sum game. In decision making, predictability in team sports is in fact bargaining, and the player has to use a mixed strategy for choosing option with highest expected utility. Player could choose a trembling hand equilibrium, to eliminate imperfect equilibrium. Strategic dominance conceipt can explain that a player could choose strategy which dominates between other possible strategies, and/or could be led by "team reasoning", too. In this article, the level of predictability of the most frequent tactical performance of one player in a team sport game is considered, reflecting outcomes both for the same team’s tactical performance (co-players in one player’s team), as well as for the opponent team’s tactical performance. Four different possible situations during team sport competition could lead to considering utilities of one player’s specific decisions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Croatian Interdisciplinary Society Provider Homepage: http://indecs.eu in its journal Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems.
Volume (Year): 6 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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game theory; team sport; tactics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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