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Equilibrium strategies in a fiscal-monetary game. A simulation analysis

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  • Irena Woroniecka-Leciejewicz

Abstract

The results from a simulation analysis of the policy-mix have been presented, carried out in a fiscal-monetary game, in which fiscal and monetary authorities make decisions from the point of view of realizing their own respective economic objectives. In order to represent the interrelations between, on the one hand, the instruments of fiscal policy and of monetary policy, and, on the other hand – the economic effects resulting from their application, a modified logistic function was used. The method adopted enables consideration of the specificity of the effects of these instruments on the business cycle, consisting in the limited effectiveness of applying any extremely restrictive or expansive policy, and the respective impact on the economy. The simulation study was meant to show the influence exerted both by the parameters of the function and the priorities of the fiscal and monetary authorities on the Nash equilibrium state, corresponding to the choice of a particular combination of budgetary and monetary policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Irena Woroniecka-Leciejewicz, 2015. "Equilibrium strategies in a fiscal-monetary game. A simulation analysis," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 25(2), pages 75-100.
    • Handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:2:y:2015:p:75-100:id:1168
    DOI: 10.5277/ord150205
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    References listed on IDEAS

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