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Division Of Labour, Specialization, And Theft Behavior — A General Equilibrium Analysis Of "Hobbes' Jungle"

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  • KE LI

    (Graduate School of Business, Nihon University, Tokyo, Japan)

Abstract

This paper develops a general equilibrium model with endogenous specialization and endogenous theft behavior to investigate effects of theft on the equilibrium network size of division of labour, on aggregate productivity, and on per capita real income. If an individual can steal from her neighbors or her trade partners, then an increase in transportation efficiency or a decrease in stealing efficiency will increase the level of division of labour where each individual's resources allocated to theft may be either lower or higher than in autarky. This shows the conventional wisdom that "wealth reduces the desire for stealing and poverty stimulates theft" is not always consistent with a sophisticated general equilibrium analysis of interdependence between per capita real income and equilibrium levels of division of labour and stealing activity. An increase in transportation efficiency and/or a decrease in stealing efficiency will raise the equilibrium level of division of labour, thereby enlarging the extent of the market, and increase aggregate productivity and per capita real income.

Suggested Citation

  • Ke Li, 2006. "Division Of Labour, Specialization, And Theft Behavior — A General Equilibrium Analysis Of "Hobbes' Jungle"," Division of Labor & Transaction Costs (DLTC), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(02), pages 163-184.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:dltcxx:v:01:y:2006:i:02:n:s0219871106000111
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219871106000111
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Division of labour; property rights; specialization; Hobbes' jungle;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D - Microeconomics
    • E1 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models
    • F - International Economics
    • F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F16 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
    • J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
    • L - Industrial Organization
    • O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth

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