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Delaying Inter Vivos Transmissions Under Asymmetric Information

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  • H. Cremer
  • P. Pestieau

Abstract

This paper develops a model of bequeathing based on a moral hazard type of argument. This model explains why altruistic parents prefer late bequests to early inter‐vivos gifts; it also analyzes whether or not they ought to leave rather equal bequests to their children even when the children end up with quite different incomes.

Suggested Citation

  • H. Cremer & P. Pestieau, 1998. "Delaying Inter Vivos Transmissions Under Asymmetric Information," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(2), pages 322-330, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:65:y:1998:i:2:p:322-330
    DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.1998.tb00153.x
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    1. Gary S. Becker & Nigel Tomes, 1994. "Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of Families," NBER Chapters, in: Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education, Third Edition, pages 257-298, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1990. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(1), pages 155-165.
    3. Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1986. "The Strategic Bequest Motive," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 151-182, July.
    4. Wilhelm, Mark O, 1996. "Bequest Behavior and the Effect of Heirs' Earnings: Testing the Altruistic Model of Bequests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 874-892, September.
    5. Chami, Ralph, 1996. "King Lear's dilemma: Precommitment versus the last word," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 171-176, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wolff, Francois-Charles & Laferrere, Anne, 2006. "Microeconomic models of family transfers," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, in: S. Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 13, pages 889-969, Elsevier.
    2. Marta Melguizo Garde, 2007. "La motivación de las transmisiones lucrativas entre generaciones de una familia: modelos teóricos y evidencia empírica," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 181(2), pages 81-118, June.
    3. Ctirad Slavik & Kevin Wiseman, 2018. "Tough Love for Lazy Kids: Dynamic Insurance and Equal Bequests," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 27, pages 64-80, January.
    4. Ralph Chami & Connel Fullenkamp & Samir Jahjah, 2005. "Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development?," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(1), pages 55-81, April.
    5. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg, 2006. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms, and Social Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(4), pages 1473-1503.
    6. Jellal, Mohamed, 2009. "Family Capitalism Corporate Governance Theory," MPRA Paper 17886, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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