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Understanding the Risk of an Avian Flu Pandemic: Rational Waiting or Precautionary Failure?

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  • Marcello Basili
  • Maurizio Franzini

Abstract

The precautionary principle (PP) has been proposed as the proper guide for the decision‐making criteria to be adopted in the face of the new catastrophic risks that have arisen in the last decades. This article puts forward a workable definition of the PP based on the so‐called α‐maximin expected utility approach, applying it to the possible outbreak of the avian flu disease among humans. Moreover, it shows how the shortage and/or lack of effective drugs against the infection of the virus A(H5N1) among humans can be considered a precautionary failure.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcello Basili & Maurizio Franzini, 2006. "Understanding the Risk of an Avian Flu Pandemic: Rational Waiting or Precautionary Failure?," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 26(3), pages 617-630, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:riskan:v:26:y:2006:i:3:p:617-630
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2006.00761.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Marcello Basili, 2008. "The global strategy to cope with H5N1: the property rights caveat," Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena 0908, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena.
    2. Marcello Basili & Antonio Nicita, 2020. "The Covid-19/SARS CoV-2 pandemic outbreak and the risk of institutional failures," Department of Economics University of Siena 823, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    3. Charles Vlek, 2013. "How Solid Is the Dutch (and the British) National Risk Assessment? Overview and Decision‐Theoretic Evaluation," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(6), pages 948-971, June.
    4. Tianjun Feng & L. Robin Keller & Liangyan Wang & Yitong Wang, 2010. "Product Quality Risk Perceptions and Decisions: Contaminated Pet Food and Lead‐Painted Toys," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(10), pages 1572-1589, October.
    5. R. Gerrard & A. Tsanakas, 2011. "Failure Probability Under Parameter Uncertainty," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 31(5), pages 727-744, May.

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