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Competitive advantage in alliance governance: resolving the opportunism minimization-gain maximization paradox

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  • Mark H. Hansen

    (Brigham Young University, UT, USA)

  • Robert E. Hoskisson

    (Arizona State University, AZ, USA)

  • Jay B. Barney

    (The Ohio State University, OH, USA)

Abstract

This paper offers a model of alliance governance that explicitly recognizes that managers of alliances simultaneously face the objectives of maximizing gains from trade while minimizing the threat of opportunism in the transaction-an apparent paradox. Our model shows that both the gains from trade and the threat of opportunism are influenced by firm characteristics (cooperative capabilities and trustworthiness) as well as transaction attributes (information asymmetry and asset specificity). The paradox may be resolved by strong form trustworthiness combined with relationship management capabilities because these characteristics allow the pursuit of gains from trade while simultaneously limiting the threat of opportunism. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark H. Hansen & Robert E. Hoskisson & Jay B. Barney, 2008. "Competitive advantage in alliance governance: resolving the opportunism minimization-gain maximization paradox," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(2-3), pages 191-208.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:2-3:p:191-208
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.1394
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    2. Fawcett, Stanley E. & Jones, Stephen L. & Fawcett, Amydee M., 2012. "Supply chain trust: The catalyst for collaborative innovation," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 163-178.
    3. Beata Stepien & Monika Sulimowska-Formowicz, 2016. "Economic Vs. Organisational Perspective On Inter-Organisational Relations’ Analysis – Are Economists On The Dead-End Track?," Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy, Institute of Economic Research, vol. 11(1), pages 159-177, March.
    4. Nilsson, Magnus & Mattes, Jannika, 2015. "The spatiality of trust: Factors influencing the creation of trust and the role of face-to-face contacts," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 230-244.
    5. Yang, Rui & Che, Tong & Lai, Fujun, 2021. "The Impacts of production linkages on cross-regional collaborative innovations: The role of inter-regional network capital✰," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).

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