The World Bank And Conditionality
AbstractThe World Bank has evolved over its fifty years of operation so that it simultaneously exercises a number of different functions. We identify three: the Bank as a bank; as a development agency; and as development research institution. We argue that the role of conditionality is crucial to understanding the World Bank's operations. The Bank applies conditionality as part of its development mission. Its ability to do so gives the Bank a comparative advantage in enforcement of debt service. This generates a complementarity between the Bank's development agency and banking functions, creating an externality. The scope of conditionality, and their implications for the World Bank are also examined, in the light of recent discussions on the subject. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Journal of International Development.
Volume (Year): 9 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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