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Decentralization and local pollution activities: New quasi evidence from China

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  • Yu Qi
  • Jinliang Yu

Abstract

Traditional fiscal federalism theory holds that decentralization may improve the provision of public goods and services. However, the social welfare field with strong externalities may face different incentives and behavioural logics. This paper provides novel empirical evidence for the causal relationship between decentralization and local pollution. In this paper, we focussed on China's widely spread decentralization reform, which substantially expanded the economic and social management autonomy of county governments. Using the difference‐in‐differences method and a panel dataset from 1998 to 2007, we found that the reform would compel affected counties to loosen environmental regulation, adopt financial and fiscal policies that would actually support heavy‐pollution industries' rapid economic growth. Overall, the reform led to a significant increase in local pollution, thus worsening the overall environmental quality. Moreover, cost‐benefit analysis indicated that the reforms generated net gains in social welfare, but the substantial environmental costs cannot be ignored.

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  • Yu Qi & Jinliang Yu, 2023. "Decentralization and local pollution activities: New quasi evidence from China," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 31(1), pages 115-159, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:ectrin:v:31:y:2023:i:1:p:115-159
    DOI: 10.1111/ecot.12328
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    2. Jie Yu & Wei Zhao & Junjun Zhu, 2023. "The Construction of Chinese Metropolitan Area from the Perspective of Politics of Scale: A Case Study of Nanjing Metropolitan Area, China," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(7), pages 1-16, June.

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