IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/canjec/v44y2011i3p814-837.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Optimal containment and policy differentiation under unilateral climate policy

Author

Listed:
  • Stefan Csordás
  • Frank C. Krysiak

Abstract

Without a broad international agreement, climate policy is less effective, owing to carbon leakage. We investigate whether this negative effect can be addressed by partially containing the policy’s effects to intermediate goods sectors, such as electricity or transportation services. We use a three‐sector model to study a policy that taxes emissions caused by intermediate goods production while subsidizing the intermediate good. We characterize the optimal containment policy for combating carbon leakage and show that it complements the concept of policy differentiation. Sans un accord international général, une politique climatique est moins efficace à cause des émissions additionnelles engendrées dans des pays moins stricts (carbon leakage). On examine si cet effet négatif peut être neutralisé en confinant les effets de la politique aux secteurs de biens intermédiaires, comme l’électricité ou les services de transport. On utilise un modèle à trois secteurs pour étudier une politique qui taxe les émissions causées par la production de biens intermédiaires tout en subventionnant le bien intermédiaire. On définit la politique de confinement optimal pour combattre cet effet négatif (carbon leakage) et on montre qu’elle est complémentaire au concept de différentiation de politiques.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Csordás & Frank C. Krysiak, 2011. "Optimal containment and policy differentiation under unilateral climate policy," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(3), pages 814-837, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:44:y:2011:i:3:p:814-837
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01656.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01656.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01656.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. C. Withagen & R. Florax & A. Mulatu, 2007. "Optimal Environmental Policy Differentials in Open Economies under Emissions Constraints," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 129-149, June.
    2. Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
    3. Hamilton, Stephen F. & Requate, Till, 2004. "Vertical structure and strategic environmental trade policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 260-269, March.
    4. Bhagwati, Jagdish N & Ramaswami, V K & Srinivasan, T N, 1969. "Domestic Distortions, Tariffs, and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy: Some Further Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(6), pages 1005-1010, Nov./Dec..
    5. Arvind Panagariya, 1999. "The Regionalism Debate: An Overview," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 455-476, June.
    6. Copeland, Brian R. & Taylor, M. Scott, 2005. "Free trade and global warming: a trade theory view of the Kyoto protocol," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 205-234, March.
    7. Golombek, Rolf & Hagem, Cathrine & Hoel, Michael, 1995. "Efficient incomplete international climate agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 25-46, May.
    8. Carbone, Jared C. & Helm, Carsten & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2009. "The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 266-280, November.
    9. Winters, L. Alan, 1996. "Regionalism versus multilateralism," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1687, The World Bank.
    10. Rutherford, Thomas F. & Böhringer, Christoph, 2002. "In Search of a Rationale for Differentiated Environmental Taxes," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-30, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    11. Finus, Michael, 2008. "Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 29-67, June.
    12. Rauscher, Michael, 1994. "On Ecological Dumping," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 822-840, Supplemen.
    13. Arvind Panagariya, 1999. "The Regionalism Debate: An Overview," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 455-476, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Csordás, Stefan & Krysiak, Frank C., 2009. "Unilateral climate policy and optimal containment in an open economy," Working papers 2009/02, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    2. Almer, Christian & Winkler, Ralph, 2017. "Analyzing the effectiveness of international environmental policies: The case of the Kyoto Protocol," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 125-151.
    3. Birgit Bednar-Friedl, 2012. "Climate policy targets in emerging and industrialized economies: the influence of technological differences, environmental preferences and propensity to save," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 191-215, May.
    4. Richard E. Baldwin, 2011. "Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocks on the Path to Global Free Trade," Chapters, in: Miroslav N. Jovanović (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Integration, Volume I, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Ru¨diger, 2013. "Flattening the carbon extraction path in unilateral cost-effective action," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 185-201.
    6. Arvind Panagariya & Rupa Dutta Gupta, 2003. "Did the Multi-fiber Agreement Make the NAFTA Politically More Acceptable? A Theoretical Analysis," International Trade 0308010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Panagariya, Arvind & Duttagupta, Rupa, 2002. "Politics of free trade areas: tariffs versus quotas," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 413-427, December.
    8. Achim Hagen & Leonhard Kaehler & Klaus Eisenack, 2016. "Transnational Environmental Agreements with Heterogeneous Actors," Working Papers V-387-16, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2016.
    9. Basak Bayramoglu & Jean-François Jacques, 2015. "International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Costly Monetary Transfers," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 745-767, December.
    10. Holtsmark, Bjart & Sommervoll, Dag Einar, 2012. "International emissions trading: Good or bad?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 362-364.
    11. Rupa Duttagupta & Arvind Panagariya, 2007. "Free Trade Areas And Rules Of Origin: Economics And Politics," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 169-190, July.
    12. Vogt, Angelika & Hagen, Achim & Eisenack, Klaus, 2020. "Buy coal, cap gas! Markets for fossil fuel deposits when fuel emission intensities differ," Working Paper Series 304708, Humboldt University Berlin, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    13. Mr. Enzo Croce & Mr. V. Hugo Juan-Ramon & Mr. Feng Zhu, 2004. "Performance of Western Hemisphere Trading Blocs: A Cost-Corrected Gravity Approach," IMF Working Papers 2004/109, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Holtsmark, Katinka & Midttømme, Kristoffer, 2021. "The dynamics of linking permit markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    15. Nikos Tsakiris & Panos Hatzipanayotou & Michael S. Michael, 2022. "Tradable Emission Permits and Strategic Capital Taxation," DEOS Working Papers 2201, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    16. Robert Hahn & Robert Ritz, 2014. "Optimal Altruism in Public Good Provision," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1403, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    17. Birgit Bednar-Friedl & Karl Farmer & Andreas Rainer, 2010. "Effects of Unilateral Climate Policy on Terms of Trade, Capital Accumulation, and Welfare in a World Economy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(4), pages 495-520, December.
    18. Di Maria, C. & van der Werf, E.H., 2005. "Carbon Leakage Revisited : Unilateral Climate Policy with Directed Technical Change," Discussion Paper 2005-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    19. Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker, 2008. "Gotcha! A Profile of Smuggling in International Trade," Conference papers 331735, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
    20. Requate, Till, 2005. "Environmental Policy under Imperfect Competition: A Survey," Economics Working Papers 2005-12, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:44:y:2011:i:3:p:814-837. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-5982 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.