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Collective investment in a common pool resource: Grower associations and food safety guidelines

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  • Aaron Adalja
  • Erik Lichtenberg
  • Elina T. Page

Abstract

Common pool resources often face overexploitation, but collective action can counteract that tendency. We investigate collective investment in reputation for produce food safety, a common pool resource because of limited branding and traceability, by U.S. commodity organizations. We use a unique dataset constructed with data from U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Drug Administration, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and industry to provide novel evidence on collective investment in common pool resources. Notably, only large shocks to reputation such as foodborne disease outbreaks resulting in hospitalization increase the likelihood of food safety guideline adoption. Adoption of food safety guidelines by government‐backed organizations results in improvements in some food safety outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Aaron Adalja & Erik Lichtenberg & Elina T. Page, 2023. "Collective investment in a common pool resource: Grower associations and food safety guidelines," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 105(1), pages 144-173, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:ajagec:v:105:y:2023:i:1:p:144-173
    DOI: 10.1111/ajae.12291
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