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Effective fillips for the harmonization of relations in an economic organization

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  • Yelena Kalabina

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of harmonization of economic interests in mutual relations between the employee and the employer of the economic organization through a prism of the economic theory of stimulus. Mutual relations between the employee and the employer in the economic organization are accompanied transaction costs and the control costs which combination and size define a choice of type of the contract which typology is presented in work. A condition of maintenance of long contract relations between the employee and the employer in the economic organization is construction of the stimulating contract which maintenance allows each participant to take the maximum utility in all admissible forms. On the basis of studying of interests of each party, conditions of the conclusion and base parameters, the model of the effective stimulating contract between the employee and the employer in the economic organization is developed.

Suggested Citation

  • Yelena Kalabina, 2012. "Effective fillips for the harmonization of relations in an economic organization," Economy of region, Centre for Economic Security, Institute of Economics of Ural Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences, vol. 1(1), pages 259-265.
    • Handle: RePEc:ura:ecregj:v:1:y:2012:i:1:p:259-265
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lazear, Edward P, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 606-620, September.
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