Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program
AbstractWe investigate empirically the extent of misreporting in a poverty alleviation program in which self-reported information, followed by a household visit, is used to determine eligibility. In the model we propose and estimate, underreporting may be due to a deception motive, and overreporting to an embarrassment motive. We find that underreporting of goods and desirable home characteristics is widespread, and that overreporting is common with respect to goods linked to social status. Larger program benefits encourage underreporting and discourage overreporting. We also estimate the costs of lying and embarrassment for different goods, and show that the embarrassment cost for lacking a good is proportional to the percentage of households who own the good. (JEL: D01, I32, I38, C25) (c) 2009 by the European Economic Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.
Volume (Year): 7 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (06)
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Other versions of this item:
- Cesar Martinelli & Susan W. Parker, 2006. "Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program," Working Papers 0602, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- César Martinelli & Susan W. Parker, 2006. "Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000120, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Cesar Martinelli & Susan W Parker, 2007. "Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000191, UCLA Department of Economics.
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- I32 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
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