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Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program

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Author Info
César Martinelli
Susan Wendy Parker

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Abstract

We investigate empirically the extent of misreporting in a poverty alleviation program in which self-reported information, followed by a household visit, is used to determine eligibility. In the model we propose and estimate, underreporting may be due to a deception motive, and overreporting to an embarrassment motive. We find that underreporting of goods and desirable home characteristics is widespread, and that overreporting is common with respect to goods linked to social status. Larger program benefits encourage underreporting and discourage overreporting. We also estimate the costs of lying and embarrassment for different goods, and show that the embarrassment cost for lacking a good is proportional to the percentage of households who own the good. (JEL: D01, I32, I38, C25) (c) 2009 by the European Economic Association.

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File URL: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.4.886
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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.

Volume (Year): 7 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (06)
Pages: 886-908
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:7:y:2009:i:4:p:886-908

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
I32 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March. [Downloadable!]
  2. Currie, Janet, 2004. "The Take-Up of Social Benefits," IZA Discussion Papers 1103, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Riphahn, Regina T., 2000. "Rational Poverty or Poor Rationality? The Take-up of Social Assistance Benefits," IZA Discussion Papers 124, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  4. James Banks & Richard Blundell & Agar Brugiavini, 1999. "Risk pooling, precautionary saving and consumption growth," IFS Working Papers W99/19, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    Other versions:
  5. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December. [Downloadable!]
  6. Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Credulity, lies, and costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 93-116, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. David Coady & Susan Parker, 2009. "Targeting Social Transfers to the Poor in Mexico," IMF Working Papers 09/60, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  2. Debopam Bhattacharya & Pascaline Dupas, 2008. "Inferring Welfare Maximizing Treatment Assignment under Budget Constraints," NBER Working Papers 14447, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. David Coady & Cesar Martinelli & Susan Parker, 2008. "Information and participation in a social program," Working Papers 0806, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

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