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Demand deposit banking and open market operations

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Listed:
  • Romar Correa

Abstract

The institutional combination of illiquid assets and demand deposit banking is regarded as vulnerable to collapse because of the impatience of depositors. We suggest that the mechanism of fully backed central bank money is a means of redress.

Suggested Citation

  • Romar Correa, 2008. "Demand deposit banking and open market operations," Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(1), pages 67-73.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:macfem:v:1:y:2008:i:1:p:67-73
    DOI: 10.1080/17520840701856241
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brock, William A. & Durlauf, Steven N. & Nason, James M. & Rondina, Giacomo, 2007. "Simple versus optimal rules as guides to policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(5), pages 1372-1396, July.
    2. Charles A. E. Goodhart, 1995. "The Central Bank and the Financial System," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262071673, December.
    3. Bennett T. McCallum, 2000. "The Present and Future of Monetary Policy Rules," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 273-286, July.
    4. C. A. E. Goodhart, 1995. "The Central Bank and the Financial System," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-37915-2.
    5. McCallum, Bennett T, 2000. "The Present and Future of Monetary Policy Rules," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 273-286, July.
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