Geometry of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium with Application to Commons and Anticommons
AbstractThe author develops a simple geometric analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the price-quantity space by exploiting the economic content of the first-order condition. The approach makes it clear that strategic interdependency in oligopoly originates from externalities among producers. This explains why cartels are unstable and casts oligopoly within the more general commons-anticommons framework.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal The Journal of Economic Education.
Volume (Year): 41 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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