This paper discusses the current 'new consensus' view on monetary policy and the theoretical framework on which that practical view relies, namely, the 'targets-and-instrument approach'. We argue that in the modern world of financial innovation and liability management central banks cannot choose between an interest rate-targeting policy and a money-targeting policy. A money-targeting regime is not desirable, if not unfeasible. In addition, in the context of Poole's approach to the 'instrument' problem, the implementation of a money-targeting regime would raise the expected value of the loss function of the central bank and would thus shift the balance in favour of an interest-rate targeting regime.
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Volume (Year): 18 (2004) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 1-19 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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