Recent studies have compared labour gains from protection in import-competing industries with the costs of protection and found that those gains are not large enough to justify trade restraints. This study utilizes a new empirical technique for estimating the costs and benefits of protection in a partial equilibrium framework, and provides a complete and consistent accounting of labour benefits including both labour rents and adjustment costs saved. We find that a small steel tariff could have generated net welfare gains for the United States in the 1980s, even though actual protection through Voluntary Restraint Agreements generated net welfare losses. Copyright 1997 by Taylor and Francis Group
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Volume (Year): 11 (1997) Issue (Month): 3 (September) Pages: 399-419 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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