Public Safety And The Moral Dilemma In The Defense Against Terror
AbstractThe economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is, however, ineffective and pre-emptive defense is required when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since pre-emption may impose collective punishment, while in the absence of pre-emption the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population's response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Defence and Peace Economics.
Volume (Year): 16 (2005)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/GDPE20
Other versions of this item:
- Franck, Raphael & Hillman, Arye L. & Krausz, Miriam, 2004. "Public Safety and the Moral Dilemma in the Defense Against Terror," CEPR Discussion Papers 4736, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
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