Tyler Cowen in this issue proposes an application of public choice and game theory as a means of understanding the Middle East conflict and viewing the ``Road Map for Middle East Peace''. Cowen's approach is not based on appreciation of the ``hidden agendas and rules of the game'' that are present in the Middle East. Economic theory may indeed usefully contribute to understanding aspects of the Middle East war, but through different avenues and in different directions from those suggested by Cowen. In this paper I suggest a view consistent with the institutional characteristics of the conflict and the objectives of the participants.
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