Public Safety and the Moral Dilemma in the Defense Against Terror
AbstractThe economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is however ineffective, and preemptive defense is required, when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since preemption may impose collective punishment, while, in the absence of preemption, the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population’s response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4736.
Date of creation: Nov 2004
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Other versions of this item:
- Rapha�l Franck & Arye Hillman & Miriam Krausz, 2005. "Public Safety And The Moral Dilemma In The Defense Against Terror," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 16(5), pages 347-364.
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
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