Political systems, stability and civil wars
Abstract
In this paper we analyze theoretically and empirically the stability of the different political systems; that is, their ability to prevent conflict. According to our model, the proportional system has a lower probability of group rebellion than the majoritarian system. In the empirical part we test the role of political systems in preventing civil wars. We show that democracy by itself does not play an important explanatory role, while the specific type of political system-majoritarian, presidential and proportional-does. The rationale of this result is that different political systems entail different opportunity costs of rebellion.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Defence and Peace Economics.
Volume (Year): 13 (2002)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 465-483
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Related research
Keywords: Democracy; Political Systems; Majoritarian; Proportional And Presidential;References
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Citations
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- repec:sae:joupea:v:45:y:2008:i:4:p:557-573 is not listed on IDEAS
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