Social Decision Rules Are Not Immune to Conflict
AbstractIn this short paper, we ask the following question: Why is lobbying so endemic in societies? Put another way, might it not be possible to design a social decision rule that assigns to each group its equilibrium probability of success, and sidestep the inefficient waste of resources that results from conflict?
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza in its series Papers with number 22.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza. Canton Grande, 9. 15003 La Coruña, Spain
Other versions of this item:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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