Visits to the client when competing for new consulting contracts: sourcing information or influencing the client?
AbstractConsulting firms (CFs) sell services on a project basis to many clients and must therefore continuously tender for new contracts. One frequently used strategy by CFs is to visit the clients in connection to the tenders. The reasons to the visits are: (1) to influence the client in his decision-making (e.g., marketing, bribing); and/or (2) to source information about the project so that a better proposal can be submitted. Using a unique database on individual export proposals submitted to emerging markets, which of these two reasons is the most important is examined empirically The estimations show that influencing the client dominates as explanation to the visits. Although it is not possible to determine whether this influence takes the form of bribing or marketing, all conditions necessary for bribes to occur are fulfilled.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics.
Volume (Year): 35 (2003)
Issue (Month): 14 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/routledge/00036846.html
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1984.
"Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
709, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Reputation and imperfect information,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
- Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
- Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-54, July/Aug..
- Roger Svensson, 2001. "Success Determinants when Tendering for International Consulting Projects," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 101-122.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1975. "The economics of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 187-203, February.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.