Visits to the Client when Tendering for Consulting Contracts: Sourcing Information or Influencing the Client?
AbstractConsulting firms (CFs) sell services on a project basis to many clients and must therefore continuously tender for new contracts. One frequently used strategy by CFs is to visit the clients in connection to the tenders. The reason to the visits is either: 1) to influence the client in his decision-making in some sense; or 2) to source information about the project so that a better proposal can be submitted. Using a unique database on individual proposals, I examine empirically which of these two reasons is the most important. The estimations suggest that influencing the client dominates as explanation to the visits.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 531.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 10 Mar 2000
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Consulting services; Procurement; Visits; Information sourcing; Lobbying; Marketing ;
Other versions of this item:
- Svensson, R., 2000. "Visits to the Client when Tendering for Consulting Contracts: Sourcing Information or Influencing the Client?," Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers 531, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
- F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L84 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Personal, Professional, and Business Services
- M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing
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