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Does signaling work in markets for information services? An empirical investigation for insurance intermediaries in Germany

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  • Eckardt, Martina

Abstract

Insurance intermediation services are information services which exhibit strong information asymmetries. We empirically analyze whether signaling works in the German market for insurance intermediation services. For this a signal must increase service quality and be easily identifiable by consumers so that it pays for intermediaries to spend the related costs. By using OLS and logit estimations we test whether intermediary type, reputational activities and a variety of signaling instruments work as credible signals. Our findings confirm the main hypotheses derived from signaling theory as to the poor working of market forces in markets for information services. Accordingly, public policy regulation is necessary to mitigate the resulting problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Eckardt, Martina, 2007. "Does signaling work in markets for information services? An empirical investigation for insurance intermediaries in Germany," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 77, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:roswps:77
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    signaling; insurance intermediation; information services;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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