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Analyzing the Impacts of Climate Change on Hydro-Environmental Conflict-Resolution Management

Author

Listed:
  • Yuni Xu

    (Wuhan University)

  • Xiang Fu

    (Wuhan University)

  • Xuefeng Chu

    (North Dakota State University)

Abstract

Conflict-resolution methods have been applied to water resources management to balance conflicting interests of stakeholders. Due to the climate change impacts on hydrologic processes, the strategy selections of conflict-resolution methods can be influenced, resulting in different selection rules for historical and future periods. This study aims to quantify the impacts of climate change on the strategy-selection rules of the conflict-resolution methods for better long-term strategic decision-making. The methodology of this study consists of climatic, hydrological, environmental and multi-objective optimization models, two fuzzy social choice methods (FSCMs) and four game-theoretical bargaining methods (GTBMs). The hydro-environmental conflict-resolution management in the Yangtze River of China is selected as the case study. The results show that the strategy selection of GTBMs is more stable and results in a better balance between hydropower and environmental objectives, compared to that of FSCMs. Moreover, considering climate change, under the appropriate environmental flow pattern, the stabilities of the strategy selections of FSCMs and GTBMs are slightly influenced, and the average satisfied degrees of both objectives obtained by FSCMs and GTBMs in the future period (2021-2080) are lower than those in the base period (1950-2012). The findings from this study provide guidance for hydro-environmental conflict-resolution management from a sustainable development perspective.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuni Xu & Xiang Fu & Xuefeng Chu, 2019. "Analyzing the Impacts of Climate Change on Hydro-Environmental Conflict-Resolution Management," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 33(4), pages 1591-1607, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:waterr:v:33:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s11269-019-2186-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s11269-019-2186-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Xiang Fu & An-Qiang Li & Hui Wang, 2014. "Allocation of Flood Control Capacity for a Multireservoir System Located at the Yangtze River Basin," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(13), pages 4823-4834, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ahmad KhazaiPoul & Ali Moridi & Jafar Yazdi, 2019. "Multi-Objective Optimization for Interactive Reservoir-Irrigation Planning Considering Environmental Issues by Using Parallel Processes Technique," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 33(15), pages 5137-5151, December.

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