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Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity

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Author Info

  • Stefan Maus

    ()

  • Hans Peters

    ()

  • Ton Storcken

    ()

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function is manipulable. The lower bound is derived when there are three alternatives to choose from. Examples of social choice functions attaining the lower bound are given. We conjecture that these examples are in fact all minimally manipulable social choice functions. Since some of these examples are even Pareto optimal, we have also derived the lower bound for Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions. Some of the minimally manipulable Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions can be interpreted as status quo voting.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-006-0202-3
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 29 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 247-269

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:29:y:2007:i:2:p:247-269

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References

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  1. Maus,Stefan & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2005. "Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability," Research Memoranda 009, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
  2. Maus,Stefan & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2004. "Minimal Manipulability: Anonymity and Surjectivity," Research Memoranda 006, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
  3. Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Minimal manipulability: Unanimity and nondictatorship," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 675-691, August.
  4. Peter Fristrup & Hans Keiding, 1998. "Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 455-467.
  5. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Maus,Stefan & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2005. "Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability," Research Memoranda 009, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
  2. Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers & Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2012. "(Minimally) ?-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities," Cahiers de recherche 04-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  3. Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September.
  4. Mostapha Diss, 2013. "Strategic manipulability of self-­selective social choice rules," Working Papers 1302, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  5. Ehud Friedgut & Gil Kalai & Noam Nisan, 2008. "Elections Can be Manipulated Often," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002121, David K. Levine.
  6. Mostapha Diss, 2013. "Strategic manipulability of self-­selective social choice rules," Working Papers halshs-00785366, HAL.
  7. Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-22988, Maastricht University.
  8. Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-22990, Maastricht University.
  9. Andersson , Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2012. "e-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities," Working Papers 2012:8, Lund University, Department of Economics.

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