Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
AbstractThis paper investigates the number of profiles at which a social choice function is manipulable. It is found that there is a lower bound on this number when the social choice function is assumed non-dictatorial. Also, any number between this lower bound and the maximal number of profiles may be obtained as the number of manipulable profiles of some social choice function.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 15 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: 30 November 1993 / Accepted: 14 April 1997
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September.
- Peters Hans & Roy Souvik & Storcken Ton, 2009.
"On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules,"
060, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Hans Peters & Souvik Roy & Ton Storcken, 2012. "On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 399-429, July.
- Maus,Stefan & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2005.
"Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability,"
009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Stefan Maus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2007.
"Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 247-269, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.