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Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions

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Author Info

  • Peter Fristrup

    (MES, Copenhagen Business School, Julius Thomsens Plads 10, DK-1925 Frederiksberg C, Denmark)

  • Hans Keiding

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark)

Abstract

This paper investigates the number of profiles at which a social choice function is manipulable. It is found that there is a lower bound on this number when the social choice function is assumed non-dictatorial. Also, any number between this lower bound and the maximal number of profiles may be obtained as the number of manipulable profiles of some social choice function.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 15 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 455-467

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:3:p:455-467

Note: Received: 30 November 1993 / Accepted: 14 April 1997
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Cited by:
  1. Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September.
  2. Peters Hans & Roy Souvik & Storcken Ton, 2009. "On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules," Research Memorandum 060, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  3. Maus,Stefan & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2005. "Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  4. Stefan Maus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2007. "Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 247-269, September.

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