Elections Can be Manipulated Often
AbstractThe Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method between at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for every neutral voting method between 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 122247000000002416.
Date of creation: 12 Oct 2008
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Other versions of this item:
- Ehud Friedgut & Gil Kalai & Noam Nisan, 2008. "Elections Can be Manipulated Often," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002121, David K. Levine.
- Ehud Friedgut & Gil Kalai & Noam Nisan, 2008. "Elections Can be Manipulated Often," Discussion Paper Series dp481, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-10-21 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-10-21 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- Maus,Stefan & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2004.
"Minimal Manipulability: Anonymity and Unanimity,"
026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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