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Autonomie der Universität und Professionalisierung ihrer Leitungsstrukturen

Author

Listed:
  • Oliver Fabel

    (Universität Konstanz, Fach D144)

  • Dominique Demougin

    (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Oliver Fabel & Dominique Demougin, 2006. "Autonomie der Universität und Professionalisierung ihrer Leitungsstrukturen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(54), pages 177-196, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:58:y:2006:i:54:d:10.1007_bf03372948
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372948
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jonathan Levin, 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June.
    2. Carayol, Nicolas & Matt, Mireille, 2004. "Does research organization influence academic production?: Laboratory level evidence from a large European university," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1081-1102, October.
    3. Fandel, Gunter & Gal, Tomas, 2001. "Redistribution of funds for teaching and research among universities: The case of North Rhine-Westphalia," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 111-120, April.
    4. Clive Bull, 1987. "The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(1), pages 147-159.
    5. Susanne Warning, 2004. "Performance Differences in German Higher Education: Empirical Analysis of Strategic Groups," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 24(4), pages 393-408, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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