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Verfügungsrechte und spezifische Investitionen: Steuerung über Budgets oder Verrechnungspreise?

Author

Listed:
  • Christian Hofmann

    (Lehrstuhl für Unternehmensrechnung und Controlling der Universität Tübingen)

  • Thomas Pfeiffer

    (Lehrstuhl für Controlling der Universität Wien)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung In jüngerer Zeit wird intensiv die Eignung von Verrechnungspreisen zur Steuerung spezifischer Investitionen diskutiert, ohne dass die alternative Steuerung über Budgets thematisiert wird. Der vorliegende Beitrag vergleicht die Steuerung spezifischer Investitionen über Budgets und über Verrechnungspreise. Beide Instrumente unterscheiden sich insbesondere im Hinblick auf die eingeräumten Verfügungs- beziehungsweise Entscheidungsrechte, was sich auf die Anreize zum Tätigen von Investitionen auswirkt. Der Vergleich der beiden Controllinginstrumente zeigt, dass Verrechnungspreise (Budgets) insbesondere bei hoher (niedriger) Umweltunsicherheit sowie heterogenen (homogenen) Bereichen dominieren.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Hofmann & Thomas Pfeiffer, 2006. "Verfügungsrechte und spezifische Investitionen: Steuerung über Budgets oder Verrechnungspreise?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 426-454, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:58:y:2006:i:4:d:10.1007_bf03371660
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03371660
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Clemens Löffler & Thomas Pfeiffer & Ulf Schiller & Joachim Wagner, 2011. "Zentralisierung, Transferpreise und spezifische Investitionen: Ein selektiver Verfahrensvergleich," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 63(63), pages 1-33, January.
    2. Stephan Lengsfeld, 2006. "Anreizwirkungen kostenbasierter Verrechnungspreise und die Vergabe von Verfügungsrechten für Investitionen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 477-505, June.
    3. Thomas Pfeiffer & Joachim Wagner, 2007. "Die Rekonstruktion interner Märkte, das Dilemma der pretialen Lenkung und spezifi sche Investitionsprobleme," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 59(8), pages 958-981, December.
    4. Robert Ullmann & Mark Trede, 2015. "Interquartilsbandbreiten bei der Ermittlung von Verrechnungspreisen: Average-Methode und Pooling-Methode," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 329-366, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D82; M40; M52;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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