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Agreement toward stability in matching markets

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  • David Cantala

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  • David Cantala, 2011. "Agreement toward stability in matching markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(4), pages 293-316, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:15:y:2011:i:4:p:293-316
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-009-0098-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alkan, Ahmet & Gale, David, 2003. "Stable schedule matching under revealed preference," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 289-306, October.
    2. Ahmet Alkan, 2001. "original papers : On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(1), pages 99-111.
    3. Charles Blair, 1988. "The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 13(4), pages 619-628, November.
    4. Ahmet Alkan, 2002. "A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(4), pages 737-746.
    5. , & ,, 2006. "A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 233-273, June.
    6. Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2004. "Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 358-376, April.
    7. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jordi Massó, 2007. "Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(3), pages 175-184, November.
    8. Cantala, David, 2004. "Restabilizing matching markets at senior level," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-17, July.
    9. Blum, Yosef & Roth, Alvin E. & Rothblum, Uriel G., 1997. "Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 362-411, October.
    10. Tamás Fleiner, 2003. "A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 103-126, February.
    11. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 47-57, January.
    12. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
    13. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mill'an Guerra Beatriz Alejandra, 2022. "The outcome of the restabilization process in matching markets," Papers 2202.12452, arXiv.org.
    2. Wu, Qingyun & Roth, Alvin E., 2018. "The lattice of envy-free matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 201-211.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; Lattice; Unanimity; Deferred Acceptance algorithm; C65; C78;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C65 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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