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original papers : On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings

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Author Info
Ahmet Alkan () (Sabanci University, Tuzla 81474 Istanbul, Turkey)

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Abstract

This paper studies the structure of stable multipartner matchings in two-sided markets where choice functions are quotafilling in the sense that they satisfy the substitutability axiom and, in addition, fill a quota whenever possible. It is shown that (i) the set of stable matchings is a lattice under the common revealed preference orderings of all agents on the same side, (ii) the supremum (infimum) operation of the lattice for each side consists componentwise of the join (meet) operation in the revealed preference ordering of the agents on that side, and (iii) the lattice has the polarity, distributivity, complementariness and full-quota properties.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 6 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 99-111
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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:1:p:99-111

Note: Received: 5 March 1999 / Accepted: 12 May 2000
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Related research
Keywords: Stable matchings; revealed preference; choice function; lattice;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-22.

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