Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 3-16
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
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Related research
Keywords: Core extensions; Efficiency; Taxation; Public goods; C71; H21; H41;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Tadenuma, K, 1992. "Reduced Games, Consistency, and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 325-34.
- Jingang Zhao, 1999. "The Core in Oligopoly Market with Indivisibility," Working Papers 99-07, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
- Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
- Moulin, Herve, 1985. "The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 120-148, June.
- Lucchetti, R. & Patrone, F. & Tijs, S.H. & Torre, A., 1987. "Continuity properties of solution concepts for cooperative games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154252, Tilburg University.
- Alexei Savvateev & Jacques Drèze & Michel Le Breton & Shlomo Weber, 2007.
"“Almost” Subsidy-free Spatial Pricing in a Multi-dimensional Setting,"
Working Papers
2007.68, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Drèze, Jacques & Le Breton, Michel & Savvateev, Alexei & Weber, Shlomo, 2008. ""Almost" subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 275-291, November.
- Dreze, Jacques & Le Breton, Michel & Savvateev, Alexei & Weber, Shlomo, 2008. ""Almost" Subsidy-Free Spatial Pricing in a Multi-Dimensional Setting," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Jacques, DREZE & Michel, LE BRETON & Alexei , SAVVATEV & Sholmo, WEBER, 2007. "‘Almost’ subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007030, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- DREZE, Jacques & LE BRETON, Michel & SAVVATEEV, Alexei & WEBER, Shlomo, 2007. "“Almost” subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting," CORE Discussion Papers 2007047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Wooders, Myrna Holtz & Zame, William R, 1984. "Approximate Cores of Large Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1327-50, November.
- Guni Orshan & Peter Sudhölter, 2010.
"The positive core of a cooperative game,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 113-136, March.
- Orshan,G. & Sudhoelter,P., 2001. "The positive core of a cooperative game," Working Papers 326, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Gooni Orshan & Peter Sudholter, 2001. "The Positive Core of a Cooperative Game," Discussion Paper Series dp268, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Kannai, Yakar, 1992. "The core and balancedness," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 355-395 Elsevier.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Stéphane Gonzalez & Michel Grabisch, 2012.
"Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
12022, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Stéphane Gonzalez & Michel Grabisch, 2012. "Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00718358, HAL.
- Stéphane Gonzalez & Michel Grabisch, 2012. "Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games," Post-Print halshs-00718358, HAL.
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