Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kannai, Yakar, 1992. "The core and balancedness," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 355-395 Elsevier.
- Gooni Orshan & Peter Sudholter, 2001. "The Positive Core of a Cooperative Game," Discussion Paper Series dp268, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Drèze, Jacques & Le Breton, Michel & Savvateev, Alexei & Weber, Shlomo, 2008.
""Almost" subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 275-291, November.
- DREZE, Jacques & LE BRETON, Michel & SAVVATEEV, Alexei & WEBER, Shlomo, 2007. "“Almost” subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting," CORE Discussion Papers 2007047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jacques, DREZE & Michel, LE BRETON & Alexei , SAVVATEV & Sholmo, WEBER, 2007. "‘Almost’ subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting," Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques) 2007030, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- Alexei Savvateev & Jacques Drèze & Michel Le Breton & Shlomo Weber, 2007. "“Almost” Subsidy-free Spatial Pricing in a Multi-dimensional Setting," Working Papers 2007.68, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Moulin, Herve, 1985. "The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 120-148, June.
- Jingang Zhao, 1999. "The Core in Oligopoly Market with Indivisibility," Working Papers 99-07, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
- Orshan,G. & Sudhoelter,P., 2001.
"The positive core of a cooperative game,"
326, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Wooders, Myrna Holtz & Zame, William R, 1984. "Approximate Cores of Large Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1327-50, November.
- Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
- Tadenuma, K, 1992. "Reduced Games, Consistency, and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 325-34.
- Tijs, S.H. & Driessen, T.S.H., 1986. "Extensions of solution concepts by means of multiplicative å-games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154256, Tilburg University.
- Lucchetti, R. & Patrone, F. & Tijs, S.H. & Torre, A., 1987. "Continuity properties of solution concepts for cooperative games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154252, Tilburg University.
- Stéphane Gonzalez & Michel Grabisch, 2012.
"Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
12022r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Apr 2013.
- Stéphane Gonzalez & Michel Grabisch, 2012. "Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12022, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Stéphane Gonzalez & Michel Grabisch, 2012. "Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00718358, HAL.
- Derks, Jean & Peters, Hans & Sudhölter, Peter, 2012.
"On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games,"
Discussion Papers of Business and Economics
4/2012, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
- Jean Derks & Hans Peters & Peter Sudhölter, 2014. "On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 37-63, February.
- Derks Jean & Peters Hans & Sudhölter Peter, 2012. "On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games," Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Yang, Yi-You, 2012. "On the accessibility of core-extensions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 687-698.
- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00718358 is not listed on IDEAS
- Yan-An Hwang, 2013. "On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 339-355, May.
- Bejan, Camelia & Gómez, Juan Camilo, 2012. "A market interpretation of the proportional extended core," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 636-638.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.