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The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games

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Author Info
Jingang Zhao (University of Saskatchewan)

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Abstract

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or if and only if it is irrational to split v(N). It then provides answers to the questions of what payoffs to split, how to split the payoff, what coalitions to form, and how long each of the coalitions will be formed by rational players in coalitional TU games. Finally, it obtains analogous results in coalitional NTU (non-transferable utility) games.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2008.27.

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Date of creation: Mar 2008
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.27

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Related research
Keywords: Coalition Formation; Core; Maximal Payoff; Minimum No-Blocking Payoff;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

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