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On the strategic origin of Brownian motion in finance

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Author Info
Hadiza Moussa Saley () (Institut Elie Cartan, Université Nancy 1 , B.P. 239, 54506 Vandoeuvre les Nancy Cedex.)
Bernard De Meyer () (CERMSEM, Université Paris 1 , Maison des sciences économiques, 106-112, Bd de l'Hopital, 75647 Paris cedex 13.)

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Abstract

This paper is concerned with the strategic use of a private information on the stock market. A repeated auction model is used to analyze the evolution of the price system on a market with asymmetric information.

The model turns out to be a zero-sum repeated game with one-sided information, as introduced by Aumann and Maschler.

The stochastic evolution of the price system can be explicitly computed in the n times repeated case. As n grows to \infty, this process tends to a continuous time martingale related to a Brownian Motion.

This paper provides in this way an endogenous justification for the appearance of Brownian Motion in Finance theory.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 31 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 285-319
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:31:y:2003:i:2:p:285-319

Note: Received: February 2002
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Related research
Keywords: Insider trading · game of incomplete information · Brownian Motion;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. MERTENSÊ, Jean-Franois & ZAMIRÊ, Shmuel, 1995. "Incomplete Information Games and the Normal Distribution," CORE Discussion Papers 1995020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. CALCAGNO, Riccardo & LOVO, Stefano M., 1998. "Bid-ask price competition with asymmetric information between market makers.," CORE Discussion Papers 1998016, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  3. Calcagno, Riccardo & Lovo, Stefano M., 1998. "Bid-Ask Price Competition with Asymmetric Information between Market Makers," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1998012, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bernard De Meyer, 2007. "Price Dynamics on a Stock Market with Asymmetric Information," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000841, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Johannes Horner & Julian Jamison, 2006. "Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions," Discussion Papers 1422, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alexandre Marino & Bernard De Meyer, 2005. "Continuous versus Discrete Market Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1535, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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