Bid-ask price competition with asymmetric information between market makers
AbstractWe consider the effect of asymmetric information on price formation process in a financial market where private information is held by a market maker. A Bayesian game is proposed in which there is price competition between two market makers with two different information partitions. At each stage players set bid and ask prices simultaneously and then trade occurs between market maker who proposes the most profitable price and liquidity traders. We characterize a set of partially revealing equilibria where the informed market maker's prices do not convey his private information. Informed player's equilibrium payoffsare proportional to prior beliefs of the market.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1998016.
Date of creation: 01 Feb 1998
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bid ask; asymmetric information; repeated auction; insider trading.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
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