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Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining

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Author Info
Krishna, Vijay
Serrano, Roberto

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Abstract

We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with the "n"-person noncooperative bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter representing the "continuation probability," [rho]. For general TU games, we characterize the set of payoffs from perfect equilibria for (1) small values of [rho]; and (2) large values of [rho]. For symmetric games a complete characterization for all values of [rho] is provided.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 24 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 259-72
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:3:p:259-72

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  1. Nicolás Porteiro, 2007. "An Efficient and Egalitarian Negotiation Procedure for Economies with Externalities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 19-40, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2006. "Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: a Generalized Bidding Approach," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2006/06, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, . "Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Cooperative Games: Core And Shapley Value," Working Papers wp2007_0709, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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