Information Use in Counter-Offer Decisions: An Examination of Factors that Influence Management Counter-Offer Decisions
AbstractWe examine factors which influence manager assessments of employee value in response to outside employment offers. Data were collected from 312 managers on counter-offer decisions. We found the size of manager counter-offers increase as a result of the attractiveness of the outside offer, the presence of a neutral, third-party recommendation and when the recommending direct supervisor has an incentive to minimize compensation costs. Additionally, we found a significant interaction between offer attractiveness and third-party recommendation, where counter-offers made to employees with highly attractive offers increased more dramatically when a neutral manager recommended the employee in addition to the immediate supervisor. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Labor Research.
Volume (Year): 33 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/12122
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