Wage bargaining and vertical differentiation
AbstractThis article intends to apply the Nash Bargaining solution to wage setting in a vertically differentiated oligopoly and to study its welfare effects. The market outcome crucially depends on the bargaining power attributed to the agents. I show that the resulting wage bargaining structure is likely to lead to another source of distortion that adds to the classical one derived by oligopoly pricing and quality choice.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Review of Economics.
Volume (Year): 54 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/12232
Other versions of this item:
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- J00 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - General
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