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Merger Profitability in Unionized Oligopoly

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Author Info
Lommerud, K.E.
Straume, O.R.
Sorgard, L.

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Abstract

We examine how a merger affects wages of unionized labour and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. If unions are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous wages. In contrast to the received literature, we find that it can be more profitable to take part in a merger than being an outsider. For firm-specific unions, on the orther hand, results are reversed.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bergen in its series Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen with number 1000.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:1000

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway
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Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
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Related research
Keywords: MERGER PROFITABILITY ; TRADE UNIONS ; ENDOGENOUS WAGES;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Sang V Nguyen & Robert H Mcguckin & Arnold P Reznek, 1995. "The Impact Of Ownership Change On Employment, Wages, And Labor Productivity In U.S. Manufacturing 1977-87," Working Papers 95-8, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bughin, Jacques, 1999. "The strategic choice of union-oligopoly bargaining agenda," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(7), pages 1029-1040, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Roll, Richard, 1986. "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 197-216, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Fridolfsson S.O. & Stennek J., 1999. "Why mergers reduce profits, and raise share prices: A theory of preemptive mergers," Working Papers 1999018, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sorgard, Lars, 1997. "Merger and product range rivalry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 21-42, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1988. "Unionized oligopoly and international trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3-4), pages 217-234, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Nilssen, Tore & Sorgard, Lars, 1998. "Sequential horizontal mergers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(9), pages 1683-1702, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Paz Espinosa, Maria & Rhee, Changyong, 1989. "Efficient Wage Bargaining as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(3), pages 565-88, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Gokhale, Jagadeesh & Groshen, Erica L & Neumark, David, 1995. "Do Hostile Takeovers Reduce Extramarginal Wage Payments?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 77(3), pages 470-85, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Davidson, Carl, 1988. "Multiunit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(3), pages 397-422, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Naylor, Robin, 1998. "International trade and economic integration when labour markets are generally unionised," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1251-1267, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Meland, Frode & Sorgard, Lars, 2002. "Unionized Oligopoly, Trade Liberalization and Location Choice," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Javier M. López Cuñat & Miguel González-Maestre, 1999. "- Delegation And Endogenous Mergers In Oligopoly," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-01, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  15. Manning, Alan, 1987. "An Integration of Trade Union Models in a Sequential Bargaining Framework," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(385), pages 121-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Ramon Fauli-Oller & Massimo Motta, 1996. "Managerial Incentives for Takeovers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(4), pages 497-514, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Straume , Odd Rune & Sorgard, Lars, 2002. "Downstream Merger with Oligopolistic Input Suppliers," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Steffen Huck & Kai Konrad, 2003. "Strategic Trade Policy and Merger Profitability," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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