Wage Bargaining, Inventories, and Union Legislation
AbstractThis paper analyses the Rubinstein bargaining game with random alternating offers when the firm has an inventory of finished goods. If the firm can sell out of that inventory during a strike, we show that the negotiated wage is a decreasing function of the inventory stock. Conversely, if the union can form an effective picket line, which blockades firm deliveries during a strike, the negotiated wage is higher and increases with the inventory stock. Noting that the 1980 and 1982 Employment Acts changed unions’ ability to form effective picket lines, the empirical section tests these theoretical predictions using a panel of firms over the period 1972–90. It was found that inventory levels did not have a significant effect on unionised firm wages prior to 1982, but have a significantly negative effect post legislation. For union firms post-legislation, and for non-union firms generally, the wage elasticity with respect to inventories is –0.1. The figures show that the mean union wage differential fell from 2.6% to 0.6% over 1974–81 and 1982–90.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1361.
Date of creation: Apr 1996
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Other versions of this item:
- Coles, Melvyn G & Hildreth, Andrew K G, 2000. "Wage Bargaining, Inventories, and Union Legislation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 273-93, April.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
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